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IN TilE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GEI-IE H. WADMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLA:<T 
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
15400 
The appellant was charged by Information with 
the crime of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a Third Degree Felony, 
under Title 76-5-404, Utah Code Annotated. The appellant 
was found guilty of a Class A llisdemeanor. From said 
conviction, the appeallant appeals. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Honorable J. Du~fy Palmer, 
presiding without a jury. The Judge, on his 01m motion, 
after expressing considerable difficulty with the case 
--1-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Tr. 224-225), reduced the matter to a Class A,,. d 
·•l.S el'\eanor, 
and placed the appellant on probation with no jail and no 
fine. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant requests that the verdict be set 
aside and that the District Court be ordered to dismiss 
the charge. In the alternative, the appellant requests 
a new trial on the reduced charge. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant separated from his wife, Sandra 
Wadman, on December 30, l97G. During the week of January i 
to January 7, the appellant's wife filed for divorce and 
had this criminal charge brought against the appellant, 
alleging that the appellant sexually abused her daughter 
(appellant's step-daughter) on three separate occasions. 
The appellant denied at trial having ever sexually abus~ 
the child (Tr. 190). 
In an attempt to defend himself, the appellant 
filed a 11otion for Bill of Particulars (Rec. p. 10), reque;· 
that the State supply the appellant with the date, aporoxi·: 
time, and location where each alleqed incident took place. 
The State replied with, a Bill of Particulars (Rec. P· 12), 
_,_ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
alleging that the incidents took place on: November 29, 1976, 
at aporoximately 6:00 to 7:00p.m. in a car; December 12, 1976, 
at approximately 8:30 p.m. at the appellant's home; and on 
December 30, 1976, at approximately 8:00p.m. at the appellant's 
home. The appellant subsequently filed a Notice of Alibi 
(Rec. p. 16), covering the alleged incidents on November 29, 
1976 and December 30, 1976. Upon receipt of the Notice of 
Alibi, the State amended its Bill of Particulars relatinq 
to November 29, 1976, a11d changed it to November 28, 1976. 
Evidence during the course of the trial oroved conclusively 
that nothing improper happened on November 28, as will be 
discussed in Argument. Based on this proof, the State was 
permitted to waver from the 28th of November and to proceed 
without tying down a date. The appellant objected and 
moved for either a mistrial or a oontinuance in order to 
prepare for a different date. This 11otion was denied 
(Tr. p. 63). 
The only evidence against the appellant 1~as the 
testimony of his former wife and his seven-year-old step-
daughter, and Judge Palmer frankly admitted he was not 
persuaded by the testimony of the appellant's ex-wife. 
There was a great deal of conff:Lcting testimony bet1~een 
the mother and daughter, and i)r. Beraman testified that 
the daughter's version of what happened with reference to 
penetration was impossible (Tr. pp. 76-77) · 
-3-
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ARGUHEl~T 
POINT I 
THE TRI.'\L COURT PERMIT'rED TilE STATE TO PREc;ENT !WJDENCE OF 
A CRII1E AS BEING COI1MITTED ON AN UHSPECIFTED DAY OTHER THA" 
AS ALLEGED IN THE BILL OF PARTICULAR.S, AND IN DOINr:; SO " 
DENIED THE APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO PURSUE I! IS ALIBI. ' 
The State alleged in its original Bill of Par-
ticulars that the appellant sexually abused his stec-da~M~, 
on three occasions, to-wit: November 29, 1976; Decemberl2, 
1976; and December 30, 1976. A Notice of Alibi was filed 
as to November 29, 1976 and December 30, 1976, and upon 
receipt of said alibi, the State amended its Bill of 
Particulars from November 29, 1976 to November 28, 1976. 
The appellant did not file a new Notice of Alibi as to 
November 28, 1976, electing to prove that nothing criminal 
happened on November 28, 1976, through the State's own 
\~itnesses. 
Initially at trial, the State's Witness, Sandra 
l'iadman, contended that the incident took place on Noveriller 2· 
1976, but the evidence and exhibits brought out durinq 
Sandra Wadman's testimony (Tr. pp. 31, 53-60) showed that 
h d N b 2 8 \·"'en the Court nothing could have appene on ovem er . vu 
continued to permit evidence alleged to have taken place ~ 
November 28, 1976, the appellant moved for a mistrial and 
· t t' preparation in the alternative, a continuance to perm1 ne . 
-4-
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of his defense for a different day (Tr. pp. 61-63). The 
Court denied the Motions and the appellant was required 
to continue with the trial (Tr. p. 63). 
In State vs. Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 Pac 860 
(1918), the defendant had been char0ed with an act oF Carnal 
Knowledge on Jply 13, 1917. Defendant had had a preliminary 
hearing based pn the July 13th incident. At trial, the 
State relied upon evidence of carnal knowledge on July 15, 
1917. In reve~sing the decision of the trial C?urt, it 
was held as follows, at page 864: 
"We are clearly of the opinion in this 
case that the court erred in overruling 
defendant's objection to the testimony 
offered by the state to prove a different 
transaction from the one for which the 
defendant had been given a pre~iminary 
examination. It follows as a necessary 
corollary from this conclusion that the 
court erred in instructing the jury t? 
the eftect that defendant might be 
convicted for such transaction." 
This Court has further held that to permit the 
State to waver from a specified date of an offense is, 
in effect, to deny the defendant defense of alibi. State 
vs. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 62 P 2d 647 (1937). 
·In United States vs~ Armco Steel Corp., 255 
F. Supp 841 (1966), the District Court of California 
discussed the nature of a Bill of Particulars and held 
as follows, at page 846: 
-5-
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"[2] A bill of particulars oncr3 obtained 
concludes the right of all of the parties 
that.are affected by it. And he who has 
furn1shed the bill of particulars under 
1t must be confined to the particulars he 
has.specified as closely and effectively 
~s 1f they constituted essential allegations 
1n a special declaration." 
The Utah Supreme Court also went into the nature 
of a Bill of Particulars in State vs. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 
117 P 2d 455 (1941), as follows; at page 458: 
"The bill of particulars is a pleading 
on the part of the state which limits 
or circumscribes the area or field, the 
transaction, as to which the state may 
offer evidence. It does not follow 
that the state may offer evidence of 
any matters set out in the bill of 
particulars. Only those matters in 
the bill of particulars which come 
within the charge stated in the infor-
mation, is open to investigation and 
evidence. The bill of particulars 
thus limits the field of inquiry 
under the charge laid in the infor-
mation, but cannot extend or expand 
the field beyond the elements 
constituting the crime charged." 
Since the appellant in this case planned to, a~ 
in fact did use, the State's Witness to prove nothing 
happened on November 28, 1976, and in effect proved his 
alibi for·that day, the State should not have been allowed 
to bring out evidence of some other, unspecified day· This 
principle has been supported by this Court in State vs. 
cooper, 114 Utah 531 , 201 P 2d 764 at 769, where it 
reaffirmed State vs. Waid, supra, as follows: 
-G-
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"[9] Tl ' 1e lssue of time may be very 
important where defendant's defense 
lS alibi. See state v. Waid, 
92 Utah 297, 67 P 2d 647." 
Based on the nature of the State's case and the 
weaknesses in it as discussed in Point II, the Court's 
consideration of the State's 'd evl ence concerning the 
alleged incident of November 28, 1976, was extremely 
prejudiced and denied the appellant his right to prepare 
and present an alibi for whenever the incident was alleged 
to have taken place. 
POINT II 
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE WAS TOO UNRELIABLE AND INCOMPETENT TO 
JUSTIFY THE VERDICT. 
The State called four witnesses to prove its case, 
and only two of those vlitnesses testified as to matters o~ 
an incriminating nature, to-wit, Sandra l~adman Painter, the 
appellant's former wife, and Lisa \~adman, the appellant's 
step-daughter. 
Sandra Wadman Painter testified that she in fact 
watched t~e appellant fondle her dauqhter on two occasions. 
The first occasion was the incident in November, 1976, in 
~~1ich she was unable, during trial, to determine the date. 
On that occasion, however, she testified that she was driving 
the family car and the appellant was in the back seat with 
-7-
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Lisa. She said that she adjusted the rear view mirror 1 an. 
watched the appellant put his hand down Lisa's pants 
(Tr. pp. 11-15). She claims this happened while she was 
driving from Ogden to Syracuse (Tr. p. 15). San1r~ 
acknowledged that she never said anythin<J to the appellant 
(Tr. p. 16). 
Hrs. Painter also testified that on November 12, 
1976 1 the appellant came home from 1vork and went into thG 
bathroom where Lisa and her sister were taking a b'l.th, and 
that she watched through a crack in the bathroom door while 
the appellant rubbed Lisa's genitals at a time when Lis~ 
was standing in the tub (Tr. pp. 16-21). But again, s~ 
acknowledged that she did not discuss this incident with 
Gene or with anyone else (Tr. 21). It seems rather diffi-
cult to believe that the mother of a seven-year-old dauqhte: 
would stand idly by and watch her daughter being molested 
and say or do nothing about it. In reveiwinq Sandra's 
testimony as a whole 1 it is obvious that she and the appellr 
argued considerably, and for her not to even brinq uo the 
subject during an argument is unbelievable. The question 
must be then asked 
1 
Why didn't she? Of course, the appella;: 
answer is that these incidents never happened. 
The appellant does contend that Sandra's rea~n 
for 50 testifying was out of vindictiveness in connecti~ 
with their divorce. In that respect, we draw the Court's 
-8-
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attention to Defendant's Exhibit 1 which was a note to the 
appellant written either the day or the day before she 
filed the criminal Complaint (Tr. p. 36). That note read 
as follows: 
'.'If you know what's good for you, 
you Wlll get the hell out of here. I 
have filed for divorce so you can expect 
papers anytime. You already have your 
clothes packed so it won't take you lonq. 
You better expect a sad ending, you will 
never be forgiven for what you have done. 
I will burn you if it's the last thing I 
do. For someone who bitches because the 
kids make a mess, you sure are one to talk. 
If it's only you living here, you sure keep 
a messy house. You can't even clean up 
water off the floor when the ~achine floods 
over. Why can't you do your own dirty 
dishes or even make your bed once in 
awhile. Uow does it feel being single 
again? Are your meals any good?" 
It seems rather ironic that Sandra would complain 
about the things she complained about and did not mention 
Lisa. \ve draw the Court's attention to the sentence that 
states: "I will burn you if it's the last thing I do." 
Sandra's testimony should be reviewed in its 
entirety in order to get the feel of her attitude, parti-
cularly in light of Judge Palmer's statement at the time 
of sentencing when he said, "I am not persuaded by your wife .•• 
I have to be frank." (Tr. p. 224). 
The testimony of Lisa differed with that of her 
mother in many respects. She testified that the incident 
-9-
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in the car happened on the way from Syracuse to Ogden 
(Tr. p. 98), the opposite direction testified to by her 
mother. She also said Gene took her pants down to her 
knees (Tr. p. 110) , whereas her mother said Gene put his 
hand down inside her pants. Lisa also said that the inci-
dent in the car took place while she was sittinq next to 
Gene (Tr. p. 97), when Sandra said that Lisa was sitting 
on his lap when it happened. It should be noted, however, 
that, after going to lunch with her mother during the noon 
recess, Lisa changed her testimony so that it was in agree-
ment with her mother's (Tr. 104-105). 
Lisa also testified that the incident in the 
bathroom took place while she was sitting in the tub (Tr. p.l 
whereas her mother testified that Lisa was standing (Tr. p.: 
Lisa also testified that the appellant insert~hu 
finger into her "pee-pee" about an inch and a quarter to 
two inches (Tr. p. 116). This was absolutely contradicted 
by Dr. Bergman when he testified that Lisa's hymen was 
still intact (Tr. p. 73), and that a penetration of only 
one-half to one centimeter would be all that was necessa0 
to come in contact with the hymen. 
As to the alleged incident on December 30, 1976, 
the appellant contends that his alibi for that date as 
·-10-
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confirmed by Terry Smith (Tr. pp. 141-145) and Cindy Smith 
(Tr. pp. 151-153) was very strong, and the State did not 
overcome its burden of disproving beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State vs. Wilson, Ut 2d • 565 p 2d 66 (1977). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the appellant's inability to present 
an alibi, due to the State's wavering from the Bill of 
Particulars, and the basic unraliability of the State's 
witnesses, the appellant respectfully requests this Court 
to order the charge against him dismissed, and in the 
alternative, that he be granted a new trial. 
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